The Man Who Looked at eBay and Saw a Mirror
We tried to sit down with Ryan Cohen, founder of Chewy, chairman of GameStop, and the man currently attempting to buy a company four times his size. to discuss ambition, audacity, and what exactly he said to his bankers. He said no, we were bonkers. This is what we think would have happened.
Let’s start at the beginning. You built Chewy from nothing into a $3.35 billion exit. That’s a legitimate origin story. Why isn’t that enough?
It’s never enough. I see undervalued things and I want to fix them. That’s just who I am.
Right. And GameStop,you saw something undervalued there too.
Absolutely. The market had written them off. I saw the community, the stores, the potential in collectibles and trading cards. We repositioned the business.
You did. And the stock went from about $4 to $500 in a matter of weeks in 2021. That must have been something.
It was extraordinary. The retail investor community believed in what we were building.
They did. And then it came back down to earth. Currently trading around $28. Are those retail investors,the ones who bought at $400,part of the community you’re still building for?
We’re focused on long-term value creation.
Of course. Let’s talk about eBay. You started accumulating a 5% stake in February,the same week eBay announced the Depop acquisition and posted its strongest quarterly numbers in years. Most people buy undervalued assets. You bought one mid-momentum. What did you see that the market didn’t?
The market is pricing eBay at its current trajectory. I’m pricing it at its ceiling. There’s a significant gap between those two numbers.
There is. And to close that gap, you’ve proposed $2 billion in annualised cost cuts within twelve months. $1.2 billion of that comes from sales and marketing. eBay spent $2.4 billion on S&M in 2025 and added one million net active buyers. You want to cut half of that budget. What happens to the buyers?
The marginal dollar of marketing spend at eBay is producing almost nothing. The model is inefficient.
The marginal dollar, yes. Rick Watson,one of the sharper analysts writing about this,makes exactly that point. But he also notes you’re making a much bigger claim about the average dollar. Cut half the budget and you don’t just lose the marginal spend. You potentially lose the brand. Anyone who ran a DTC P&L through 2023 watched that happen in real time. Why is eBay different?
eBay has 134 million active buyers. The brand doesn’t need $2.4 billion to hold that base.
It might not need it to hold the base. It definitely needs something to grow it. eBay just signed a headline sponsorship of Saturday Night Live UK specifically to introduce eBay Live to a new generation of buyers. That’s brand spend doing exactly what brand spend is supposed to do. You’d cut the budget that funds moves like that.
We’d be more targeted. More efficient.
More targeted than Saturday Night Live UK?
[pause]
We’d find the right vehicles.
Let’s talk about the vehicles. 1,600 GameStop stores as authentication centres, fulfilment hubs, live commerce studios. That’s the part of your proposal that survives the most scrutiny. It’s a genuinely interesting idea. But GameStop’s mainstay business buys goods wholesale and resells them through physical stores. eBay earns fees without touching inventory. These are not just different companies. They’re structurally opposite business models. How do you integrate them without breaking both?
The stores are the story. The physical network is something eBay could never build organically. We’re not merging the business models,we’re adding infrastructure.
You’re adding infrastructure that employs tens of thousands of people across a retail footprint that’s been contracting for years, onto a marketplace business that has succeeded precisely because it doesn’t carry the costs of physical retail. Morgan Stanley called the business models “fundamentally different.” Michael Burry,who once compared you to Warren Buffett,sold all his GameStop shares and called the strategy pedestrian. These are not obscure critics.
Michael is entitled to his view.
He is. He also said your honest intent is to dominate collectibles and used goods, not compete with Amazon,that the Amazon framing is cover for a narrower play. Is he wrong?
I think the opportunity is bigger than collectibles.
You said on CNBC that “we have the ability to issue stock to get the deal done.” That’s the financing answer you gave on national television for a $56 billion acquisition. eBay shareholders receiving GameStop stock as part of their consideration are being asked to swap equity in a cash-generative, debt-free marketplace for equity in a $12 billion retailer whose valuation is partly a function of the deal itself. Can you see why that’s a hard sell?
We have $9.4 billion in cash. We have a $20 billion highly confident letter from TD Securities. The financing works.
The financing works if the stock leg is accepted by institutional shareholders who own the majority of eBay’s float. Those shareholders watched eBay trade at $110 against your $125 offer,a fifteen dollar gap that represents the market giving your deal roughly a coin flip’s chance of closing. What do you say to the institutional eBay shareholder who has watched the stock rise 20% this year, seen Depop acquired, seen the SNL UK partnership, seen Q1 GMV up 18%, and is now being asked to take GameStop paper as part of the exit?
We’re offering a 46% premium to where eBay was trading in February.
A 46% premium to February’s price. A 20% premium to Friday’s close. And the premium is being paid partly in the currency of a company whose market cap depends significantly on retail investor sentiment and the success of this very deal. That’s not a criticism,it’s a structural observation. Has any institutional investor told you privately they’re comfortable with the stock leg?
We’re in active discussions.
You went on CNBC and the market went to $110. You needed it to go to $125. That’s the gap between a press tour and a deal.
We’re just getting started.
Let’s end where we began. You looked at eBay,a company with the right strategy, the right infrastructure, genuine momentum, a 30-year brand, 134 million buyers, $1.5 billion in free cash flow,and decided it needed you to rescue it. eBay’s position is that the turnaround is working and disruption is the wrong call. Make the case, in one sentence, for why you’re right and they’re wrong.
They’re executing at the speed of a company that doesn’t want to get fired. I’m offering the speed of a company that has nothing to lose.
That’s a very honest answer.
I know.
It’s also, for an eBay shareholder, the most frightening thing you’ve said today.
[smiles]
Ryan Cohen, thank you for your time.
The Ostrich Report covers ecommerce strategy, platform dynamics, and the business of retail for senior operators and industry insiders. Sometimes we interview people who haven’t technically agreed to be interviewed.
Ryan Cohen declined to comment. The quotes above represent what he would have said if he had.
Such a fascinating deep dive into the mindset of one of the most disciplined figures in eCommerce. What struck me most was how you highlighted that Ryan’s success isn't just about strategy, but about that relentless, uncompromising focus on the consumer. The 'Behind the Interview' perspective really adds layers to what we see on screen. Another masterclass in understanding the 'why' behind the 'how.' Brilliant work, Vinny!